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Risk Sharing Between
Competing Health Plans
And Sponsors
Analysis of Dutch health plan data points to ways in which
payment systems can be improved in other countries.
by Erik M. van Barneveld, René C.J.A. van Vliet, and Wynand P.M.M.
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ABSTRACT: In many countries, competing health plans receive capitation pay-
ments from a sponsor, whether government or a private employer. All capitation
payment methods are far from perfect and have raised concerns about risk
selection. Paying health plans partly on the basis of capitation and partly on the
basis of actual costs (“risk sharing”) reduces plans’ incentives for selection but
sacrifices some incentives for efficiency. This paper summarizes our empirical
research on Dutch health plans with respect to various forms of risk sharing. All
sponsors can improve their payment systems by either implementing or chang-
ing their form of risk sharing.
C
ompeting health plans in the United States and several
European countries receive capitation payments from a
sponsor, be it government or a private employer.1 In some
settings the capitation payments constitute plans’ entire revenue,
while in others the plans may charge members an additional pre-
mium. In the latter case, a plan usually has to quote the same pre-
mium to each member that chooses the same modality of the speci-
fied benefits package.2 Under capitation, a plan has incentives to
provide the highest quality of health care at the lowest possible
price. However, a plan also has incentives to select individuals that
it expects to be profitable (“preferred risk selection”).
As far as we know, all practical applications of capitation leave
ample room for risk selection. This is especially true for capitation
based solely on demographic variables, but it also holds for capita-
tion partly based on diagnostic information from prior hospitaliza-
tions.3 The first type of capitation is used by various sponsors in
Europe, while the latter type has been applied since 1 January 2000
by U.S. Medicare to pay at-risk health maintenance organizations
(HMOs). Obviously, improving capitation methods may reduce in-
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centives for risk selection, but such improvement appears to be
difficult for sponsors to achieve. Therefore, some sponsors have de-
cided to pay plans partly on the basis of capitation and partly on the
basis of a plan’s actual expenditures. Various names are used for
such combinations of prospective and retrospective payment sys-
tems: “blended payment systems,” “mixed payment systems,” “par-
tial capitation,” “pooling,” and “risk sharing.”
In this paper we use the latter term.4 We assume that the purpose
of risk sharing is to reduce plans’ incentives for selection while
retaining their incentives for efficiency as much as possible. The
simplest form of risk sharing is that a plan is reimbursed for a certain
fraction of all actual costs of all members.5 We refer to this form of
risk sharing as “proportional risk sharing.” A second form of risk
sharing is that health plans are (partially) reimbursed for the expen-
ditures of a member above a certain threshold.6 We refer to this as
“outlier risk sharing.”
As far as we know, the relative strength of these and other forms
of risk sharing has not yet been studied. Therefore, we compared the
consequences of the two forms of risk sharing mentioned above and
those of two alternative forms as well. In our empirical analyses, we
use demographic capitation, because this type is widely used, and
data are generally available. Moreover, under demographic capita-
tion the selection problem is larger than under the Medicare capita-
tion in use since January 2000. We focus on the question of which
form of risk sharing yields the best trade-off between incentives for
efficiency and incentives for preferred risk selection.
n Study assumptions. We  assume a  regulated  competitive
health plan market. “Health plans” can be sickness funds, such as in
Belgium, Germany, or the Netherlands. They can be HMOs, such as
in the Medicare sector in the United States, or they can be (groups
of) health care providers that receive capitation payments, such as
general practitioner (GP) fundholders in the United Kingdom in the
1990s. The “sponsor” commonly is the government, but it also may
be an employer or a group of employers. We assume a specified
benefit package that covers short-term care such as hospital care,
prescription drugs, and physician services.7 Moreover, we assume
that plans may contract selectively with providers of care and that
they may offer various insurance modalities of the specified benefit
package, provided that each modality covers all specified types of
care.8 We assume that plans have to periodically accept anyone who
wants to buy a modality of the specified benefit package (“open
enrollment”). Therefore, consumers can choose the plan and the
insurance modality they like the most, on either a mandatory or
voluntary basis. Finally, we assume that a plan has to quote the same
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premium to each member that chooses the same insurance modality.
n Selection/efficiency trade-off. In  the situation described
above, health plans can apply various tools to improve the efficiency
of care, such as utilization management, disease management, and
high-cost case management.9 The potential savings appear to be
substantial. 10 However, it has been argued that plans may use many
(subtle) tools for preferred risk selection, such as the service of the
plan; the quality, reputation, and service of its contracted health
care providers; the design of the benefit package; and the design of
supplemental health insurance policies, selective advertising, and
direct mailing.11
Although a plan might gain by selection, it has drawbacks for
society as a whole.12 First, access to good health care for the chroni-
cally ill may be hindered. Second, efficient plans might lose market
share to inefficient plans that are successful with selection. Third,
any resources used for selection can be seen as social welfare losses.
Given these drawbacks, many are convinced that the prevention of
selection is critical to the success of a regulated competitive individ-
ual health plan market.
It is well known that major incentives for selection exist under
capitation based only on demographic variables. With risk sharing,
plans’ incentives for selection can be reduced, but some of their
incentives for efficiency will be lost. In our empirical analyses, we
simulate a  health plan’s potential  selection gains under  various
forms of risk sharing as a supplement to demographic capitation.
We also simulate which part of various cost reductions a health plan
would retain under the various forms of risk sharing. Under demo-
graphic capitation without risk sharing, a health plan retains all of
the savings, but when risk sharing is employed, a health plan shares
the savings with the sponsor.
n Forms of risk sharing. Risk sharing can take many forms.13
Here we assume that the sponsor would require the risk sharing to
be budget-neutral from its own point of view.14 We analyze the two
forms of risk sharing mentioned earlier (proportional and outlier)
and applied in practice. We also analyze two other forms of risk
sharing: one where plans are reimbursed for the expenditures of a
small, fixed fraction of their members who actually were the costli-
est (“risk sharing for high costs”) and one where plans are reim-
bursed for the expenditures of a small, fixed fraction of their mem-
“Many are convinced that the prevention of selection is critical to
the success of a regulated competitive market.”
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bers that the plans themselves have designated for risk sharing in
advance (“risk sharing for high risks”). Under the latter, plans are
allowed to designate those members whom they expect to generate
the largest losses, given the capitation payments. As far as we know,
neither of these types of risk sharing is currently applied in practice.
n Prior costs as a risk adjuster. An alternative to risk sharing is
to base capitation payments partly on prior costs. A simple way to
do this is to reimburse the plans for a certain fraction of their mem-
bers’ spending in the previous year. This clearly resembles propor-
tional risk sharing. So, a relevant question is whether supplement-
ing a certain capitation formula with (proportional) risk sharing or
employing prior-year costs as an additional risk adjuster within the
capitation formula yields the same trade-off between selection and
efficiency. 15
Empirical Analyses Of Risk Sharing
n Data. For this study we analyzed administrative data for six
consecutive years (1988–1993)  for 47,210 members  of one Dutch
sickness fund. Originally, the data were gathered in the context of a
study on capitation payments that were based in part on diagnostic
information from previous hospitalizations.16 All members had the
same insurance coverage and the same benefits. The data include
demographic characteristics, the annual costs for several types of care,
and the diagnoses from hospital admissions. For a subset of 10,553
members, health survey data were available as well. Data on annual
health care spending included virtually all short-term health care ex-
penditures (including the costs for prescription drugs). The average
amount spent on health care in 1993 was U.S.$829 per member.17
n Methods. First, we calculated demographic capitation pay-
ments and analyzed the plan’s incentives for selection (Exhibit 1).
Then, we analyzed the four forms of risk sharing as a supplement to
these capitation payments. This was done in two ways. In the first
case, the four forms of risk sharing were specified so that for each
form the plan would retain the same fraction of its savings if it
reduced all expenditures by 10 percent. This way, the plan’s incen-
tives for efficiency are roughly similar for the four forms of risk
sharing; this enabled us to examine incentives for selection while
keeping incentives for efficiency constant (see Exhibit 1). In the
second case, the forms of risk sharing were specified such that the
plan would earn the same amount of money by selecting all indi-
viduals it expects to be profitable under demographic capitation
payments and avoiding all others. So, we could examine incentives for
efficiency while keeping incentives for selection constant (Exhibit 2).
Finally, we calculated capitation payments based on the demo-
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graphic variables as well as prior-year expenditures. Subsequently,
we compared the plans’ incentives for selection under these capita-
tion payments with those under the demographic capitation pay-
ments supplemented with proportional risk sharing (Exhibit 3).
The weight on actual costs in the latter case was chosen to equal the
weight on prior costs in the first case. This way, the plans’ incentives
for efficiency are kept constant.
n Results. Exhibit 1 shows, for various subgroups, how much
the plan would lose on these members, on average, per member.
Because the plan can identify these subgroups in advance of the year,
these losses are predictable losses. The higher the predictable losses,
the higher are the incentives for selection. The exhibit shows the
remaining predictable losses after each of four forms of risk sharing
is used as a supplement to demographic capitation.
For those with the highest costs for prescription drugs two years
before, proportional risk sharing reduces the loss from $5,179 to
$4,143, and outlier risk sharing reduces it to $3,644. Risk sharing for
high costs would reduce the loss to $2,519, and risk sharing for high
EXHIBIT 1
Mean Losses In 1993 By A Health Plan, Per Member, For Some Subgroups Of
Members After Application Of Risk Sharing, In U.S. Dollars
Members with the
highest costs for
prescription drugs in
1991 (>$1,047)c 1.0% $5,179 $4,143 $3,644 $2,519 $1,483
Members with the
most years with
hospitalization in
the period 1989–1992
(3 or 4 years)c 1.0 5,298 4,238 3,480 2,174 1,108
Members with
chronic illnessd
Heart disease
Diabetes
Cancer
1.8
1.7
1.2
1,850
1,237
2,394
1,482
990
1,915
1,463
1,025
1,482
869
749
835
801
691
515
SOURCE: Based on E.M. van Barneveld, “Risk Sharing as a Supplement to Imperfect Capitation: A Tradeoff between Selection
and Efficiency,” Journal of Health Economics 20, no. 2 (2001): 147–168.
NOTE: The specific variants presented here are proportional risk sharing with a weight of 0.2 on actual costs; outlier risk sharing
with a threshold of U.S.$17,094; risk sharing for high costs for 0.5 percent of the members; and risk sharing for high risks for 3
percent of the members. Under these variants, the plans’ incentives for efficiency are roughly constant.
a Based on ordinary least squares regression with costs in 1993 as the dependent variable and age, sex, degree of urbanization,
and disability as the independent variables. R2 = .047.
b All losses are statistically significantly different from zero (two-sided t-test, p < .05), except the loss of $515 under risk sharing
for high risks for the subgroup with cancer.
c Value was chosen to yield a subgroup with 1 percent of plan members.
d Subgroups formed on the basis of the health survey data.
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risks, to $1,483. The latter two forms of risk sharing reduce incen-
tives for selection more than the first two forms do. An advantage of
risk sharing for high risks in comparison with risk sharing for high
costs is that it yields greater reductions in predictable losses for the
subgroups distinguished here.
For each of the four forms of risk sharing, Exhibit 2 shows the
plan’s portion of savings if each one is used as a supplement to
demographic capitation. If the plan reduced the costs for hospital
and specialist care by 10 percent, it would retain 70 percent of the
savings in the case of proportional risk sharing. In the case of outlier
risk sharing, it would retain only 52 percent. Under the other forms
of risk sharing, the plan’s portion of the savings would be higher.
A disadvantage of risk sharing for high risks in comparison with
risk sharing for high costs is that it apparently retains fewer incen-
tives for efficiency with respect to several subgroups that a plan
could choose for the application of disease management. For in-
stance, if the plan reduced the cost for diabetes patients by 20 per-
cent, it would keep 89 percent of the savings under risk sharing for
high costs. In the case of risk sharing for high risks, it would keep
only 71 percent. Thus, if disease management for the chronically ill is
seen as the most promising strategy to improve efficiency of care,
risk sharing for high costs may be more appropriate than that for
high risks.
Exhibit 3 shows the predictable losses for some subgroups in the
case of proportional risk sharing as a supplement to demographic
EXHIBIT 2
Proportion Of Savings Retained By A Health Plan, After Application Of Risk Sharing
Various types of care
Hospitala
Prescription drugs
Paramedical
70%
70
70
52%
88
92
72%
94
98
83%
90
93
Various subgroups of membersb
Heart patients
Diabetes patients
Cancer patients
70
70
70
41
57
38
76
89
65
68
71
47
SOURCE: Based on E.M. van Barneveld, “Risk Sharing as a Supplement to Imperfect Capitation: A Tradeoff between Selection
and Efficiency,” Journal of Health Economics 20, no. 2 (2001): 147–168.
NOTES: We assumed a 10 percent reduction of the costs for various types of care and a 20 percent reduction of the costs for
various subgroups of members, respectively. Given such an assumption, we subsequently calculated the portion of the savings
that would be retained by the plan itself. The other part of the savings is retained by the sponsor as a result of the risk sharing. In
all cases risk sharing is a supplement to the demographic capitation payments. The specific variants presented here are
proportional risk sharing with a weight of 0.3 on actual costs; outlier risk sharing with a threshold of U.S.$8,547; risk sharing for
high costs for 0.5 percent of the members; and risk sharing for high risks for 1.5 percent of the members. Under these variants,
the plan’s incentives for selection are roughly constant.
a Including the costs of specialist care.
b Based on health survey data.
258 RISK
SHARING
H E A L T H A F F A I R S ~ V o l u m e 2 0 , N u m b e r 3
D a t a W a t c h
capitation and in the case of capitation payments based on demo-
graphic variables and prior-year costs. Remember, the higher these
losses, the greater the plan’s incentives for selection. Using prior-
year costs as an additional risk adjuster next to demographic vari-
ables yields a greater reduction of the plan’s incentives for selection
than does proportional risk sharing as a supplement to the demo-
graphic capitation payments, while the plan’s incentives for effi-
ciency are kept constant.
Discussion
In many countries competing health  plans receive demographic
capitation payments from a sponsor. If for whatever reason such
capitation payments cannot be improved, the sponsor might con-
sider reimbursing the plans using proportional risk sharing or out-
lier risk sharing. Our empirical analyses shows that, roughly speak-
ing, these forms of risk sharing yield similar trade-offs between
selection and efficiency. More importantly, our analyses show that
three other forms of risk sharing yield a better trade-off: risk sharing
for high risks, and employing prior costs as an additional risk ad-
juster. None of these three alternatives yields a uniformly better
selection-efficiency trade-off than the others.
n Limitations of the study. Our study is limited in several ways.
First, we assumed that a plan has to quote the same premium to each
member who chooses the same insurance modality of the specified
benefit package. If this rate restriction is weakened by allowing a
plan to vary the premium within a certain minimum and maximum,
EXHIBIT 3
Mean Losses In 1993 By A Health Plan, Per Member, Based On Demographic
Capitation And Prior-Year Costs, In U.S. Dollars
Members with the highest costs for
prescription drugs in 1991 (>$1,047) 1% $3,055b $2,732b
Members with the most years with a
hospitalization in the period 1989–1992
(3 or 4 years) 1 3,126b 2,315b
Members with chronic illnessc
Heart disease
Diabetes
Cancer
1.8
1.7
1.2
1,092b
730b
1,413b
562
593
1,090
SOURCE: Based on E.M. van Barneveld “Risk Sharing as a Supplement to Imperfect Capitation in Health Insurance: A Tradeoff
between Selection and Efficiency ” (Doctoral thesis, Erasmus University, Rotterdam, the Netherlands, 2000).
NOTES: The R2 value of the relevant ordinary least squares regression equation is .197.
a The weight on actual costs is set at 0.41, which equals the regression coefficient of prior-year expenditures in the prior cost
model.
b Statistically significantly different from zero (two-sided t-test, p > .05).
c Based on health survey data.
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outlier and proportional risk sharing are still straightforward. How-
ever, the two other forms of risk sharing may make premium calcu-
lations difficult, because it would be unclear for which part of a
potential member’s future costs the plan is at risk. Second, we as-
sumed that a definition of so-called acceptable expenditures within
the context of the specified benefit package and cost data are avail-
able for at least two consecutive years. The definition of “acceptable
expenditures” could become problematic if the specification of the
benefit package becomes less detailed and health plans offer many
different insurance modalities of the specified package. If cost data
are not available for all types of care, it might be possible to use
imputed costs (based on health care utilization and imputed
prices). Another option would be to limit risk sharing to types of
care for which cost data are already available, such as hospital care.18
Third, we assumed that the purpose of risk sharing is to reduce
plans’ incentives for selection while maintaining their incentives for
efficiency as much as possible. In other studies, the purpose of risk
sharing appears to be different.19 If such is the case, different trade-
offs have to be made. Finally, we included four forms of risk sharing
in the empirical analyses. Other forms of risk sharing are also possi-
ble, such as condition-specific risk sharing.20 However, such risk
sharing may result in  discussions  over which conditions  should
make members eligible for risk sharing and may induce manipula-
tion by plans. With the forms of risk sharing that we analyzed, this
is not the case.
n Implications for health policy. Given that all current applica-
tions of capitation payments leave ample room for risk selection, it is
remarkable that most sponsors do not employ any form of risk shar-
ing as a supplement to their capitation payments. In 2001 this is the
case in the Czech Republic, Germany, Switzerland, and the United
States.  Some  sponsors  have  supplemented their  capitation pay-
ments with either proportional risk sharing or outlier risk sharing
(Belgium and the Netherlands). In sum, all countries with a com-
petitive health plan market could improve their methods of paying
plans either by implementing some form of risk sharing or by chang-
ing the form of risk sharing they now use.
“It is remarkable that most sponsors do not employ any form of
risk sharing as a supplement to capitation.”
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